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Abstract
In-field demonstrations in real-world scenarios boost the development of a rising technology towards its
integration in existing infrastructures. Although quantum key distribution (QKD) devices are already
adopted outside the laboratories, current field implementations still suffer from high costs and low
performances, preventing this emerging technology from a large-scale deployment in telecommunica-
tion networks. Here we present a simple, practical and efficient QKD scheme with finite-key analysis,
performed over a 21 dB-losses fiber link installed in the metropolitan area of Florence (Italy). Coexis-
tence of quantum and weak classical communication is also demonstrated by transmitting an optical
synchronization signal through the same fiber link.
Introduction
In a society based on the continuous exchange of sensi-
tive data and information, the importance of secure
and trustful communications is essential. Quantum
key distribution (QKD) allows to share data in an
information-theoretical secure way, no longer based on
computational assumptions but exploiting the basic
principles of quantum mechanics [1–3]. During the
last 30 years, many QKD protocols have been devel-
oped and tested over optical fiber spools in laboratory
demonstrations, achieving long transmission distances
and key generation rates up to hundreds of Mbit/s [4–9]
However, this technology is still far from a large-scale
deployment in existing fiber networks and telecom in-
frastructures, due to multiple factors: low secret-key
rate, limited distance between users, lack of applica-
tions, high costs and high requirements in terms of
low-noise fiber links. In order to reveal practical con-
troversies in real-world deployments, several QKD field
trials have been implemented by exploiting installed
fiber links on a metropolitan scale, with tens of kilo-
meters of typical distance between nodes [10–21].
Deployed commercial channels inherently suffer from
higher losses and noise (due to splices, connections,
bends and interfiber cross-talk), moreover their long-
term stability is affected by changes in the environ-
mental conditions and physical stress. Although many
field trials were performed on a dark fiber (thus requir-
ing a dedicated link for quantum key transmission),
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Figure 1: State of the art of QKD field trials. Re-
cent QKD demonstrations with classical and quantum sig-
nal propagating through the same installed fiber. Total
classical launch power is reported in dBm. Ref [18] used
SNSPDs detectors, all the other used InGaAs detectors.
other experiments tested the coexistence between weak
quantum signals and classical intense pulses propagat-
ing through the same installed fiber [18–21]. Classical
light includes synchronization signals for QKD [18] or
high-speed data traffic [19–21] and is mixed with quan-
tum signals by means of dense wavelength division mul-
tiplexing (DWDM) schemes, often combined with po-
larization multiplexing [20] and wide-range wavelength
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Figure 2: Experimental setup The transmission channel is a dark fiber link connecting LENS laboratory, where Alice
and Bob are located, to a telecom datacenter, in a loop-back configuration. Laser Q: continuous wave laser at 1560.61
nm; Laser C: continuous wave laser at 1536.61 nm; IM: intensity modulator; PM: phase modulator; BS: beam splitter;
DWDM: dense wavelength division multiplexing filter; DLI: delay line interferemoter; SPD: single photon detector. In
the green square we reported the three quantum states prepared by Alice and propagated through the channel.
multiplexing (WDM) in C- and O-band [21]. Recent
demonstrations are presented in Figure 1, where the
average secret key rate achieved is reported with the
corresponding transmission losses and total classical
launch power.
In this work we present a low-cost field demonstra-
tion of a complete QKD system, performed over an
installed fiber link situated in Florence and exhibit-
ing 21 dB transmission losses. A secret key rate of
3.4 kbit/s is achieved with a finite-key analysis, in the
case of simultaneous transmission of synchronization
signal (with -29 dBm launch power) and quantum sig-
nal through the same fiber at a different wavelength in
the C-band. Time stability of the apparatus is demon-
strated as well, by employing a servo-locked fiber-based
interferometer for security checking.
The fiber link adopted for key exchange is a portion
of a dark-fiber network connecting the entire Italian
peninsula, from Turin National Institute of Metrolog-
ical Research (INRIM) to Matera Space Center. This
installed fiber about 1700 km in length, currently em-
ployed for time standard dissemination, constitutes the
proper environment for a future setup of a large-scale
quantum communication network, referred as the Ital-
ian Quantum Backbone [22].
Experimental setup
As illustrated in Figure 2, the experimental setup con-
sists of a transmitter (Alice) and a receiver (Bob) con-
nected by a metropolitan dark-fiber link in a loop-back
configuration. A fiber mirror is installed at one end of
the fiber (situated at the telecom datacenter in Flo-
rence) in order to drive light back to the European
Laboratory for Non-linear Spectroscopy (LENS) where
Alice and Bob are located. The total length of the loop-
back fiber is about 40 km, with an overall transmission
loss of 21 dB. Channel stability in terms of attenua-
tion was monitored for several hours, as reported in
Figure 3 a). Figure 3 b) shows the dark fiber per-
formances in terms of noise, mainly due to interfiber
cross-talk. The count rate reported is acquired with a
single-photon detector, after applying a 200 GHz dense
wavelength division multiplexing (DWDM) filter (de-
tector dark counts are here subtracted, i.e. 2700 Hz).
We performed the three-state BB84 protocol with
time-bin encoding in a finite-key scenario, which has
the advantage of being a simple and efficient solu-
tion for practical QKD [23]. Quantum states belong-
ing to Z basis are employed for key generation, while
X basis is implemented for security checking (Figure
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Figure 3: Characterization of the transmission
channel. a) channel losses during a three-days acquisition;
b) noise counts evaluated for different wavelengths with a
single photon detector after applying a 200 GHz DWDM
filter.
2). The security of this protocol against general at-
tacks has been proven to be maintained, with finite-
key analysis, when only two detectors are employed at
the receiver, thus simplifying considerably the experi-
mental resources [24]. Whenever weak coherent pulses
(WCPs) are prepared instead of single photons, a very
efficient one-decoy state scheme can be implemented in
order to detect photon number splitting attacks [25,26].
This simplified BB84 protocol was demonstrated re-
cently in the record-breaking QKD transmission over
421 km optical fiber [4].
To prepare a train of modulated WCPs, Alice carves
with an intensity modulator (IMs) the time-encoded
pulses from a tunable continuous wave (CW) laser,
emitting ITU-T channel 21 (1560.61 nm). The repeti-
tion rate of quantum states is ν = 595 MHz. A second
IM is used to implement the one-decoy state technique
with µ1 = 0.41 and µ2 = 0.15 photons per pulse (only
one intensity is reported in Figure 2 for simplicity).
Then, light is sent through a phase modulator (PM)
for phase randomization of each state. An alternative
solution would be employing a pulsed laser working in
gain switching mode: in this way the phase of the weak
coherent states is intrinsically random and the setup
can be further simplified. Finally, a variable optical
attenuator is used to reach the single photon regime.
In order to test the QKD system in a more practical
scenario, the synchronization signal between users is
carried out by classical light propagating through the
same fiber together with quantum pulses, by using a
2x1 beam splitter as shown in Fig. 2. To prepare the
optical synchronization signal, a second laser working
at 1536.61 nm (DWDM 200 GHz channel 51) modu-
lated by an extra IM with a custom pattern format
at 0.145 Mbit/s is used. Classical light at -29 dBm
launch power is then combined together with quantum
pulses and sent through the dark fiber link. At Alice’s
side, four electrical outputs generated by a field pro-
grammable gate array (FPGA) are used to drive the
IMs for quantum and synchronization signals. Electri-
cal pulse width is approximately 100 ps, whereas the
obtained optical pulse width is around 150 ps. The
PM is driven by a digital-to-analog converter (DAC)
which uses 8 bit to obtain 28 − 1 different phase val-
ues. Furthermore, a pseudo random binary sequence
of l = 212 − 1 bit is used as a key generator, although
a quantum random number generator should be used
in a real implementation [27–29]. (This device can be
included in future realization directly on Alice’s FPGA
board.) At Bob’s side, a DWDM filter is used to sep-
arate classical and quantum light (channel 21 and 51
respectively of the 200 GHz DWDM filter). Classi-
cal pulses serve as reference signals for a time tagging
unit, which collects the electrical outputs from the two
InGaAs single photon detectors (SPDs) that are em-
ployed for quantum state measurements [30]. Bob’s
choice of measurement basis is made passively by a 10
dB beam splitter. In the Z basis, one SPD is used
for collecting photons and detecting their arrival time,
while pulses measured in the X basis are sent to an un-
balanced fiber-based Mach-Zehnder (MZ) interferome-
ter. A second SPD monitors one of the two outputs of
the MZ, in order to check for potential eavesdropping
disturbances. Additionally, to phase-stabilize Bob’s in-
terferometer, a feedback system involving a counter-
propagating CW laser (emitting ITU-T channel 35 of
a 200 GHz DWDM filter, 1549.32 nm) is employed.
The optical power monitored at the other MZ input
allows a piezoelectric system to lock the phase, thus
self-stabilizing X basis measurements.
Results and discussion
In Figure 4 we present the in-field performances of
our QKD scheme in terms of quantum bit error rate
(QBER) achieved in both measurement bases and final
secret key rate (SKR) evaluated with a finite-key anal-
ysis [24]. We performed a 4 hours continuous key ex-
change with simultaneous transmission of optical clock
signals and a 10 hours continuous key exchange with
electrical synchronization provided by Alice’s FPGA.
These results are achieved without manual stabiliza-
tion of the experimental setup, thanks to our servo-
locking fiber-based interferometer. As expected for our
loop-back setup, the average SKR obtained with opti-
cal synchronization (3.40 kbit/s) is slightly lower than
the average SKR obtained with electrical synchroniza-
tion (4.53 kbit/s) provided by simply connecting Alice
and Bob through the optical bench. This is mainly due
to the background noise generated by classical pulses
propagating through the same fiber channel, that re-
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Figure 4: Stability of the system over time. Error
rates, raw and secret key rate acquired for multiple hours
in two different channel conditions: a) only quantum signal
in the channel, b) both quantum and classical are coprop-
agating through the fiber.
sults in higher QBER in both measurement bases. In
addition, electrical synchronization is more stable and
accurate than the optical one. A different and more
efficient filter can be employed in order to maximize
the secret key parameter.
As it is shown in Figure 5, our SKR values are com-
patible with the expected rate achievable by this proto-
col when single photon detectors operate in saturation
regime [24]. Furthermore, the simulations show the
performances of our system in case of shorter (longer)
fiber link with the same intrinsic optical attenuation.
Our system can generate a positive key rate up to 28 dB
channel losses, which corresponds to 175 km of ultra-
low loss single mode fiber.
Figure 6 shows the performances of our system (evalu-
ated with electrical synchronization only) with increas-
ing launch power of a CW laser light (emitted at ITU-T
Channel 51) sent into the fiber channel, with 21dB loss,
together with quantum signals (ITU-T Channel 21).
As expected, the increasing classical power degrades
both the Z basis QBER and interferometer visibility
(related to X basis QBER), in a way that at -27 dBm
the overall error exceeds the threshold value that pre-
vents a secret key to be shared. At this power level,
more advanced multiplexing schemes are required for
secret key exchange with this protocol and detectors.
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Figure 5: Secret key rate generation. Secret key rate
as a function of the channel losses. The averaged rates
achieved in our continuous key exchange for the two cases.
The red dot represents the case with only quantum light,
whereas the blue dot represents the case with classical and
quantum light. The data are averaged over 10 minutes
of measurement. Parameters used: probability of Z basis
pz = 0.9, probability of X basis px = 0.1, block size of
n = 109, probability of µ1 and µ2 of 0.7 and 0.3, a secrecy
parameter sec of 10
−9 with a correctness parameter cor
of 10−9, dead time of 20 µs, detector efficiency of 20% and
the efficiency of the receiver of 0.5, and of 0.28 for Z basis
and X basis respectively.
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Figure 6: System robustness against classical
power. Z basis quantum bit error rate and X basis visi-
bility as functions of classical light power copropagating in
the same fiber by means of a DWDM scheme. Secret key
rate generation is feasible up to -27 dBm of classical power.
Conclusions
In conclusion, we demonstrated a simple and low-
cost quantum key distribution system over a field trial
link. Quantum and weak classical light have been co-
propagated along an installed fiber, proving the stabil-
ity of the entire system for more than 4 hours. This
work acts as a milestone for the future Italian quan-
4
tum network, proving how the already installed fiber
can be pursued for quantum communication over the
whole country.
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